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LEGISLATION - SERVICE OF PROCESS ON
NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS
In 1935 the Legislature of West Virginia enacted a statute
providing for substituted service of process on nonresidents in
actions growing out of accidents or collisions in which they may be
involved while operating motor vehicles on the highways of this
state. Unfortunately, the original Senate bill containing this provision was consolidated with another and, when passed, appeared
as section 15 of an act' the title of which reads:
"An Act to amend chapter seventeen of the Code of West Virginia one thousand nine hundred thirty-one, by adding thereto
article twenty, relating to the protection of the public against
reckless and irresponsible persons on public highways, the
operation of motor vehicles on public highways and the
financial responsibility of owners and operators of motor
vehicles for damages caused by such operation and providing
penalties."

1 W. Va.

'

Acts 1935, c. 61.
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In the case of Elliott v. Hudson,2 decided in April of last year, the
Supreme Comt of Appeals held that section 15 "embraces a matter
not stated in the title of said act, nor germane to the matters stated
in the title, and is therefore unconstitutional and void because violative of section 30, article 6 of the Constitution of West Virginia,
which provides that no legislative act 'shall embrace more than one
object, and that shall be expressed in the title.' ' Judges Litz
and Woods dissented. Only a few weeks before, the Supreme Court
of Indiana, in which state title requirements are substantially the
same as in our own,4 had said that "service of process is germane
to and properly connected with the subject of financial responsibility of owners and operators of motor vehicles"5 and therefore held that the subject of service of process on a nonresident
contained in the body of a statute was embraced in the title of an
act which read:
"An Act concerning the financial responsibility of owners
and operators of motor vehicles for damages caused by the
operation of motor vehicles on public highways."
While the more liberal attitude of the Indiana court will no doubt
commend itself to many, it would seem that if practical meaning
and effect are to be given to the constitutional requirements there
was ample justification for the conclusion reached by the West
Virginia court. Careless draftsmanship should be neither encouraged nor condoned. The difficulty experienced in finding this
provision in the published Acts of the Legislature lends support to
the court's contention that it was "buried in the midst of a
voluminous statute on other subjects" and that the title was "insufficiently informative' '.7 Its disposition of the case was not unexpected.
The more usual grounds of attack upon statutes of this nature
-that they are violative of the privileges and immunities8 and the
due process9 clauses of the Federal Constitution - were also urged
in the case of Elliott v. Hudson.0 Having decided the case on anE. 465 (W. Va. 1936).
3Id. syllabus.
4IND. CONST. art. 4, § 19.
2185 S.

Herman v. Dransfield,
SInd. Acts 1931, c.179,
7 Elliott v. Hudson, 185
S U. S. CONST. Art. IV,

200 N. E. 612, 613 (Ind. 1936).
§ 15.
S. E. 465, 467 (W. Va. 1936).
§ 2.

9 U. S. CONST.Amend. XIV.

lo 185 S. E. 465, 466 (W. Va. 1936).
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other ground, these questions were not considered by the court. In
view of the consistent upholding of such statutes as constitutional
when attacked on these grounds," it is highly improbable that a
different view would now be taken by any court. Similar statutes
are in effect in at least three-fourths of the states and, apparently,
extensive use is being made of this type of service. 2
At the recent session of the Legislature a new act" was passed
to take the place of the one declared void by the court. It is entitled
"An Act to amend article three, chapter fifty-six of the
Code of West Virginia, one thousand nine hundred thirty-one,
by adding thereto section thirty-one, to provide for the service
of process on non-resident operators of motor vehicles in legal
actions involving accidents or collisions on the streets or highways of West Virginia by appointing the auditor as attorney
for the service of process upon such non-resident operators."
While the subject matter is the same as that of the 1935 Act, 4 a
number of important changes from the provisions of the earlier
act have been made, to some of which it may be helpful to call attention. No attempt will be made to discuss the more general
aspects of such legislation. Whether the constitutional basis for
this kind of process is to be found in implied consent, in the
power of the state to legislate for the general welfare, namely, the
police power, 6 or, as the American Law Institute would have it,
in the doing of an act within the state,' has been discussed fully
in this' and other legal periodicals. 19 This discussion will be confined to a few of the questions which the provisions of the new act
suggest.
11 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927) ; Jones v. Paxton,
27 F. (2d) 364 (D. C. Minn. 1928); Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 363 (N. D.
Tex. 1932) ; Barbieri v. Pandiscio, 116 Conn. 48, 163 At]. 469 (1932).

12 See Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Besidert Motorists (1934) 32
L. REv. 325, notes 3 and 4.
13 House Bill No. 189. Passed March 1, 1937; in effect from passage.
14 W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 61, § 15.

MICH.

O'Donnell v. Slade, 5 F. Supp. 265 (D. C. Pa. 1933).
16 Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22, 344 N. E. 760 (1924) ; State v. Belden,
193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916 (1927) ; Cohen v. Plutschak, 40 F. (2d) 727 (D.
C. N. J. 1930).
27 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 84.
's Note (1928) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 283.
'9 Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 HAEV. L. REv.
563; Culp, supra n. 12. See also Notes (1935) 20 IowA L. REv. 654, and (1936)
12 IND. L. J. 73.
'5
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The title of the act is, of course, new and appears to be free
from objection on constitutional grounds. That it embraces only
one" object" and that that" object" is clearly expressed cannot be
seriously questioned. The change by which this new form of service, which, under the former statute was made a part of a chapter
pertaining to roads and highways,20 will now appear as a part of
Article 3 of Chapter 56 which deals with writs, process and order
of publication, should also receive general approval. It will be
noted also that the state auditor now becomes the attorney for the
service of process upon nonresident operators. In the former act
the state road commissioner was designated as such attorney.
Of more importance, are the changes to be found in the body
of the new act. Some of these have been made apparently for the
purpose of settling questions which have been raised by similar
provisions in the laws of other states. Others have been inspired
by experience gained in administering the former statute. A number of these changes were made by way of amendment after the
introduction of the new bill.
Among the many questions presented by these statutes, perhaps the most vital is that of the method of giving notice to the
defendant. Without adequate provision for notice, the constitutional requirement of due process is not satisfied. 1 A variety of
methods of giving notice are found in the statutes of the different
22
states. These include notice by registered mail to the defendant,
by first class mail to the last known address of the defendant,2 3
and by personal notice to the defendant. -4 The former West Virginia statute provided:
"Service of such process shall be made by leaving a copy
thereof, with a fee of two dollars with said commissioner in
his office . . . and such service shall be sufficient service upon
said non-resident, provided that notice of such service and a
copy of the process shall forthwith be sent by registered mail by
said commissioner to the defendant, and the defendant's return
receipt is appended to the original process and filed therewith
in court."
REV. CODE (1931) c. 17.
21 Wuehter v. Pizzutti, 276 I. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259 (1928).
22 For statutes providing for this method of giving notice, see Culp, supra n.
12, at 338, note 56.
23 See Jones v. Paxton, 27 F. (2d) 364 (D. C. Minn. 1928).
24 N. Mex. Laws 1931, c. 127, § 2.
20W . VA.
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This would seem to be a reliable means of giving notice to the de.
fendant, and the courts have uniformly upheld such statutory provisions as constitutional.' 5 A practical difficulty, however, has
arisen in the states whose statutes provide for this method of giving
notice. It has been the tendency of the courts to construe strictly
the provisions of these statutes and a literal compliance has been
required. Accordingly, it has been held that the return receipt
for the registered letter must be filed as prescribed before the
action may proceed,20 and in one instance, service was held to be
invalid where the receipt was not filed although notice was actually
received and receipted for.2 7 Since it is to be expected that a defendant, aware of the likelihood of suit, will refuse to sign a return
receipt such strict construction places a serious obstacle in the way
of this method of service of process.
This difficulty was among the first that arose in the few instances in which substituted service was attempted under the
former West Virginia statute.. To prevent a defendant from thus
defeating its purpose, the new act provides that the service shall
be sufficient if "the registered mail so sent by said auditor is refused by the addressee and the registered mail is returned to said
auditor, or to his office, showing thereon the stamp of the postoffice department that delivery has been refused, [and] is appended
to the original process and filed therewith...."
In other states this difficulty has been met by providing an
alternative method of service in case a return receipt cannot be
obtained. For instance, the Texas statute2 provides that notice
may be given by any disinterested person by leaving a copy of the
notice in person if notice sent by registered mail is not delivered or
is refused. This personal notice would add to the cost of the service and for that reason would appear to be less desirable than the
substitute provided for in the West Virginia statute. The constitutionality of the latter provision would not seem to be open to
25 Moore v. Payne, 35 F. (2d) 232 (D. C. La. 1929) ; Cohen v. Plutschak, 40
F. (2d) 727 (D. C. N. J. 1930).
26 Dwyer v. Shalck, 248 N. Y. S. 355 (1931) ; Smyrmios v. Weintraub, 3 F.
Supp. 439 (D. C. Mass. 1933).
27 Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5 Harr. 304, 165 Atl. 327 (Del. 3932).
But
see Creadlick v. Keller, 5 Harr. 169, 171, 160 Atl. 909 (Del. 1932), in which
the court held the service valid where the defendant was given the contents
of the envelope but refused to sign a receipt, saying: "It would create an intolerable situation if the defendant could, by his own wilful act, or refusal to
act, prevent the plaintiff from maintaining his action."
28 Tex. Gen. Laws 1933, c. 70, § 2.
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question since a refusal by a defendant to accept service does not
prevent a court from acquiring jurisdiction in other cases.29
Another question raised under the former West Virginia act
concerned the signing of the return receipt. 'Must it be signed by
the defendant personally? It has been held that the requirement
is fully complied with by filing a "return receipt" given in accordance with the rules or customs of the Post Office Department by
the defendant or by some other person authorized to receive
registered mail addressed to the defendant. "0 The new act provides
for the filing of the defendant's return receipt "signed by himself
or his duly authorized agent"; and provides further that duly
authorized agent shall "include among others a member of the
family of such non-resident or a person who, at the residence, place
of business or post office of such non-resident usually receives and
receipts for mail addressed to such non-resident."
The former West Virginia statute also left open the question
whether the privilege to employ this form of service of process was
limited to residents. While it would seem that the primary purpose of such legislation is the protection of inhabitants of the state
against the hardship of travelling long distances to sue nonresidents, in the absence of a specific limitation the courts have uniformly held that nonresidents as well as residents may avail themselves of this statutory method of service. 3' This view has been
taken where both plaintiff and defendant were residents of the same
state.32 The new act specifically includes an "action or proceeding
brought by non-resident plaintiff or plaintiffs .
The question of the extent of the application of these statutes
also has been the source of much litigation. The early acts referred
only to a "nonresident who operates a motor vehicle on any public
street or highway of the State." Following their practice of con struing these statutes strictly, 33 the word "operate" was given its
29 Borden v. Borden, 63 Wis. 374, 23 N. W. 573 (1885); Boggs v. InterAmerican Mining & Smelting Co., 105 Md. 371, 66 Atl. 259 (1907).
30 Shushereba v. Ames, 255 N. Y. 490, 175 N. E. 187 (2931). Accord:
Gesell v. Wells, 229 App. Div. 11, 240 N. Y. S. 628, 633 (1930); Syracuse Trust
Co. v. Keller, 5 Harr. 304, 165 At. 327 (Del. 1932).
31 State v. Circuit Court of Dane County, 209 Wis. 246, 244 N. W. 766
(1932); Sobeck v. Koellmer, 240 App. Div. 736, 265 N. Y. S. 778 (1933);
Garon v. Poirier, 86 N. H. 174, 164 Atl. 765 (1933).
32 State v. Circuit Court of Dane County, 209 Wis. 246, 244 N. W. 766
(1932).
33 Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5 Harr. 167, 165 AtI. 327 (Del.
1932); Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 265 (N. D. Tex. 1932); Brown v. Cleveland Tractor Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251 N. W. 557 (1934).
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literal meaning by the courts 34 with the result that the statute was
held to apply to the nonresident operator no matter to whom the
car belonged, but not to apply to a nonresident owner if his car
was being operated at the time of the accident by his employee" or
child.," The doctrine of vicarious liability was not permitted to
extend the operation of the statute by implication to persons who
were not clearly within its terms. This obvious defect has been
corrected in later statutes, which generally extend the application
to "a nonresident or his agent" ;7 "a nonresident owner, chauffeur,
operator or driver' ",3or to an action against a nonresident "growing out of any accident or collision in which the nonresident may
be involved by reason of the operation by him, for him, or under
his control or direction, express or implied, of a motor vehicle on
a public highway of this State." 3 9
The former West Virginia statute applied to "the operation
by a non-resident or by his duly authorized agent . . . while so
operating or so permitting to be operated a motor vehicle on any
such street or highway." This language was clearly intended to
make this statutory service applicable to the nonresident owner
although his car was being operated by another at the time of the
collision; but it left somewhat uncertain who was and who was not
a "duly authorized agent". An employe or servant acting within
the scope of his employment would clearly be such; but would a
child, using the car for his own purpose be a "duly authorized
agent" under the "Family Car" doctrine? The new act follows
the language of the old in this respect, but it provides further that:
"'Duly authorized agent' shall mean and include among
others a person who operates a motor vehicle in this State for
a non-resident as defined in this section and act, in pursuit of
business, pleasure, or otherwise, or who comes into this state
and operates a motor vehicle therein for, or with the knowledge
or acquiescence of, such non-resident. ....
"
If a nonresident parent is liable under our "Family Car" doctrine
for damage done by his child while driving in this state, this
34 Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 365 (N. D. Tex. 1932) ; O'Tier v. Sell, 252
N. Y. 400, 169 N. E. 624 (1930). Contra: Poti v. New England Road Ma.
chinery Co., 83 N. H. 232, 140 Atl. 587.
33 Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 365 (N. D. Tex. 1932); O'Tier v. Sell, 252
N. Y. 400, 169 N. E. 624 (1930).
-30
Gescll v. Wells, 229 App. Div. 11, 240 N. Y. S. 628 (1930).
37 NEB.Comp. STAT. (1929) c. 20-530.
3s Ark. Acts 1933, act. 39.
39 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie 1935) § 491(a).
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definition of "duly authorized agent" is clearly broad enough to
include such child. That the parent is liable if the law of the
place of wrong makes him so although by the law of the state
where the permission was given to use the automobile no such
liability exists, is the rule of conflict of laws set out in the Restatement of that subjeot.40
Neither the former statute nor the new one indicates whether
the "duly authorized agent" who was operating the car at the time
of the accident, as well as the nonresident owner, is subject to this
statutory form of service. Under similar statutes in other states
it has been assumed that he is."'
It is generally agreed that these statutes should be applicable
to nonresident corporations as well as individuals. However, where
an act did not apply expressly to a nonresident corporation, it
was construed as not applying to such a corporation whose resident
agent was operating the car.42 A contrary result was reached by
a New York court.43 The present West Virginia statute provides
expressly that " 'non-resident' shall mean any person who is not
a resident of this state, and among others includes a non-resident
firm, partnership, corporation or voluntary association." Corporations were included also under the former West Virginia statute.
A significant change is the reduction of the amount of the
bond required to be executed by the plaintiff "conditioned that on
failure of the plaintiff to prevail in the action that he will reimburse
the defendant . . the necessary expense incurred by him in and
about the defense of the action in this state. . . ." The former
statute required a bond of $500.00. This has been reduced to
$100.00 by the new act. The need for such a bond became evident
soon after statutes of this nature came into general use. Devised
for the purpose of saving a plaintiff the expense of travelling a
long distance to maintain his action, they have become a temptation
to the bringing of groundless actions on the chance that the defendant would not travel such a distance with his witnesses to make
a defense. The $500.00 bond required under the former West Virginia statute was greatly in excess of that usually required in such
statutes and may have been a factor in keeping down the number
40RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT Op LAWS

(1934)

§

387 (d).

163 Atl. 469 (1933).
I. 69, 157 Atl. 426 (1931).
43 Besson v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transport, 135 Aisc. 368, 237 N. Y.
S. 689 (1929).
.41 Barbieri v. Pandiscio, 116 Conn. 48,
42 lesas v. Hurley Machine Co., 52 R.
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of cases in which this form of service was used under the former
statute." A $100.00 bond as now required, should check the evil at
which it is aimed and at the same time not unduly discourage a
plaintiff who might hesitate to incur a possible expense of $500
although reasonably sure that he has a meritorious case.
Another important change restricts the use of this form of
service of process to actions or proceedings "in any court of record
in this state. . . ." Under the former act it could be employed in a
proceeding before a justice of the peace. This change makes possible the further provision for the execution of the bond before the
clerk of the court, with surety to be approved by said clerk. The
requirement of the former act, that sureties be approved by the
commissioner in every case, imposed a considerable burden on
that office.
In general the changes made by the act are to be commended.
Not all the questions which these statutes present have been settled, but enough has been done to lessen subsLantially the number
that will have to be litigated.
EDMUND C. DICKINSON.
44 This form of service was used in only six cases during the year the former
act was in force.
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